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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SPREADER SPECIALISTS, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
No. 21037
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH; BRENT H. CAMERON, Chairman;
JAMES M. BYRNE, Commissioner;
BRIAN T. STEWART, Commissioner,
Respondents.
BRIEF OF PROTESTANT W. S. HATCH COMPANY

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Is the Utah Public Service Commission's denial of petitioner's application for operating authority so clearly
unreasonable or irrational that it must be deemed arbitrary and
capricious?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. S 54-7-16 (1973):
. . . [Supreme Court] review shall not be extended
further than to determine whether the commission has
regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order or decision under review
violates any right of the petitioner under the Constitution of the United States or of the state of Utah.
The findings and conclusions of the commission on

questions of fact shall be final and shall not be subject to review. Such questions of fact shall include
ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the
commission on reasonableness and discrimination. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-5 (1973):
. . . If the commission finds from the evidence that
the public convenience and necessity require the proposed service or any part thereof it may issue the
certificate as prayed for, or issue it for the partial
exercise only of the privilege sought, and may attach
to the exercise of the right granted by such certificate such terms and conditions as in its judgment the
public convenience and necessity may require, otherwise such certificate shall be denied. Before granting a certificate to a common motor carrier, the
commission shall take into consideration the financial
ability of the applicant to properly perform the service sought under the certificate and also the character of the highway over which said common motor carrier proposes to operate and the effect thereon, and
upon the traveling public using the same, and also the
existing transportation facilities in the territory
proposed to be served. If the commission finds that
the applicant is financially unable to properly perform the service sought under the certificate, or that
the highway over which he proposes to operate is
already sufficiently burdened with traffic, or that
the granting of the certificate applied for will be
detrimental to the best interests of the people of the
state of Utah, the commission shall not grant such
certificate.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Utah
Public Service Commission denying petitioner's application for
authority to operate as a motor carrier of certain liquid
petroleum and liquid petroleum products in intrastate commerce.
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Course of Proceedings Below
Following nine days of evidentiary hearing, the commission
on April 12, 1985 issued its findings of fact and conclusions
of law denying petitioner's application.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration.

(R. 1487-1505.)

(R. 1508-27.)

The com-

mission denied the motion for reconsideration on November 5,
1985.

(R. 1691-94.)

The petition for review was filed

December 4, 1985. (R. 1699-1700.)
Statement of Facts
Spreader Specialists ("Spreader") seeks authority to operate "as a common carrier for the transportation of liquid
petroleum and liquid petroleum products (except propane and
butane), in bulk, in tank vehicles over irregular routes from
and between all points in the State of Utah."

(R. 1488-89.)

Four companies hold operating authority which conflicts with
that requested by Spreader:

W. S. Hatch Company; Mat lack,

Inc.; Clark Tank Lines, Inc.; and Energy Express, Inc. Each of
those companies protested Spreader's application.
1381-83, 1378-80, 1375-77.)

(R. 1370-74,

Several other protests were filed,

but were withdrawn after amendment of Spreader's petition to
eliminate conflict with those other protestants* operating
authorities.

(R. 1384-1401.)

Following nine days of evidentiary hearing, and extensive
briefing, the commission made detailed findings of fact and
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conclusions of law.

(R. 1487-1505.)

Essentially, the commis-

sion concluded that Spreader was financially fit, although
marginally so (R. 1491-92, 1502), but that the existing carriers were providing adequate service, were experiencing excess
equipment capacity and would be financially impaired if the
requested authority were granted.

(R. 1496-98, 1501-02.)

W. S. Hatch Company ("Hatch") submits that the statement of
facts in Spreader's brief is inconsistent with the evidence and
with the facts as found by the commission, and therefore submits its own statement of the facts, with particular emphasis
on those facts which are either omitted from Spreader's brief
or which Hatch maintains Spreader has stated in a manner contrary to the commission's findings.
Spreader sought authority to render four distinct types of
service:

1) transportation of liquid asphalt, 2) distribution

of liquid asphalt at job sites, 3) transportation of crude
petroleum from well sites to refineries, and 4) transportation
of refined products from refineries to customers.

(R. 1490.)

The authority sought directly conflicted with Hatch's operating
authority or business in the first three categories and in substantial areas of the fourth category.

(R. 1372.)

The evidence showed that the asphalt transportation business
in Utah is highly seasonal, with peak demand occurring in July,
August and September, and virtually all asphalt transportation
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occurring between the months of May and October.

(R. 1490-91.)

This seasonal Mboom and bust" cycle creates a substantial
financial hardship on carriers, who must maintain expensive
equipment adequate for the transportation and spreading task
throughout the year, even though such equipment is only used
during the summer months.

(R. 1491.)

The crude and distillate

petroleum transportation businesses are less seasonal, but are
secondary to Spreader's primary asphalt business.

(R. 1493.)

The commission's denial of the requested authority was not,
as Spreader claims, based solely on the financial harm the
commission found would be caused to existing carriers. Rather,
the commission went through an extensive analysis of all relevant factors.

The commission found that the existing transpor-

tation service was adequate for the current market and for
expected future growth.

(R. 1498-99.)

Each of the protesting

carriers had experienced significant excess equipment capacity,
and the commission found that granting authority to Spreader
would likely only exacerbate that condition.

(R. 1498.) Fur-

ther, the commission found that the existing rate structure was
competitive, and that Spreader did not propose to charge a rate
lower than the current market rate.

(R. 1496.)

Finally, the commission found that each of the protesting
carriers, although efficiently operated (R. 1500-01, 1692), was
operating at a loss or with minimum profits, with a substantial
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portion of their revenues potentially divertable by Spreader if
the requested authority were granted.

(R. 1497-98.)

The com-

mission expressed concern that existing carriers might be
forced to cut corners on safety and maintenance expenses
(R. 1501), and that further financial impairment of existing
carriers might precipitate closure or curtailment of services
to remote locations within the state, which Spreader did not
propose to service.

(R. 1501.)

Based on those conclusions, the commission found that the
existing services were adequate, and that approval of Spreader's
application would only worsen an already difficult situation.
The commission concluded:
Were the Utah operations of the existing carriers
financially sounder, or were we convinced Applicant's
entry into the market would offer the shipping public
real benefit, we would be inclined to grant the application. However, on this record, we conclude the
application must be denied. (R. 1503.)
Following denial of its application, Spreader moved for
reconsideration, claiming that the commission's decision was
based solely on the financial harm to other carriers.
(R. 1508-27.)

The commission denied the motion, reasoning that

the appropriate analysis requires a balancing of all relevant
factors, and specifically rejected Spreader's request that the
commission adopt a presumption in favor of applicants that
increased competition necessarily serves the public interest.
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(R. 1691-94.)

The commission reasoned that, while competitive

benefits were a factor to be considered, they were outweighed
in this case by the detrimental results such additional competition would create.

(R. 1692.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

Review of decisions of the Public Service Commission

is extremely limited.

Decisions of the commission must be

affirmed so long as the commission has regularly pursued its
authority.
A.

Review of the commission's basic fact-findings in

this case is limited to determination of whether there is evidence "of any substance whatever" supporting the decision.

If

the record discloses such evidence, the finding of fact must be
affirmed.
B.

The commission's determination of the public

convenience and necessity is a decision of executive policy,
not a judicial decision, and must be upheld so long as it falls
within the limits of reasonableness or rationality.
II.

The commission went through an extensive analysis of

all of the factors bearing upon the public convenience and
necessity in this case, and under the applicable standard of
review, the commission's resolution of the issues against
Spreader must be affirmed.
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A.

The case of Big K Corp. v. Public Service Commis-

sion, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1984), does not represent a departure
from prior decisions of this court.

Big K only requires that

the commission not give excessive weight to any single factor,
to the exclusion of other important factors, when determining
the issue of public convenience and necessity.

So long as the

commission takes into consideration all of the relevant factors, its decision falls within the bounds of its discretion
and must be upheld.
B.

The commission in this case carefully and cor-

rectly analyzed all of the factors mandated by statute, by the
Big K case and by prior case law.
1.

The commission determined that the benefits

to be derived from additional competition did not justify
granting of the application.

It specifically found that cur-

rent rates were low and competitive, and that Spreader did not
propose to service territories not already served.
2.

The commission further determined that

existing transportation facilities were adequate and responsive
to the needs of shippers.

In this regard, it found that exist-

ing carriers had ample equipment and had in fact experienced
substantial idle equipment problems.

The commission's determi-

nation of this issue was consisted with its statutory duty to
prevent duplication of services.
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3.

Finally, the commission determined that, in

contrast to the minimal benefit to be derived from competition,
the potential detrimental effect of competition was substantial.

It determined that additional competition would finan-

cially impair existing carriers, thus posing safety risks and a
risk of deterioration in service to the public.
C.

The Big K case creates no evidentiary presumption

based upon increased competition.

Instead, it emphasizes that

competition is one of many factors to be taken into account in
the analysis, and that competition might be a positive or negative factor.
III.

This position is consistent with prior case law.

The commission's findings of basic fact in this case

are supported by substantial evidence.

Under the applicable

standard of review, which provides that such fact-findings must
stand if they are supported by evidence Hof any substance whatever," the findings must be affirmed.
A.

For purposes of the factual analysis, the ser-

vices Spreader provides under its lease of equipment to Matlack
must be considered to be services of Matlack.
B.

The commission's determination that existing

transportation facilities are adequate was supported by substantial evidence.

When the concessions Spreader's witnesses

made on cross examination are taken into account, the evidence
reveals that some shippers have expressed a general desire for
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additional carriers, but that Spreader has not borne its burden
of proving by specific, affirmative evidence that there is a
genuine inadequacy in the level of existing services.
C.

The Commission's finding that projected growth

did not justify granting of authority to an additional carrier
was also supported by substantial evidence.

The evidence was

that the intrastate asphalt business has declined substantially, and that the other relevant transportation demands are
increasing at a very modest rate.

The commission's determina-

tion that the existing carriers could and should handle any
increase in demand is within its exclusive policy-making
authority.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLATE REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION IS STRICTLY LIMITED, AND
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IN THIS CASE.
This court's review of rulings of the Public Service Commission is strictly limited.

The statute under which this

court reviews commission decisions provides:
[Supreme Court] review shall not be extended further
than to determine whether the commission has regularly
pursued its authority, including a determination of
whether the order or decision under review violates
any right of the petitioner under the Constitution of
the United States or of the state of Utah. The findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of
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fact shall be final and shall not be subject to
review. Such questions of fact shall include ultimate
facts and the findings and conclusions of the commission on reasonableness and discrimination.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (1973).
While this court has not applied the statutory provision
literally, it is nevertheless clear that decisions of the PSC
on questions of fact and ultimate fact are accorded great
weight.

With regard to pure fact-findings, the court has held:

The standard of review that affirms Commission
findings on questions of basic fact if they are supported by "evidence of any substance whatever" and
sets them aside only if they are "without foundation
in fact" is the standard this Court will follow in
reviewing the Commission's findings of basic facts in
this case.
Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service
Commission ("Wexpro II"), 658 P.2d 601, 609 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).
With regard to findings of ultimate fact, such as the
determination of public convenience and necessity in the case
at bar, the court has recognized that the commission's decisions should be accorded great weight, both because the commission has special expertise in dealing with the subject matter and because the determination of public convenience and
necessity is a policy decision which the legislature has delegated to the commission.

This court in Wexpro II stated the

applicable standard of review as follows:
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The degree of deference extended to the decisions
of the Commission on these intermediate types of
issues has been given various expressions, but all are
variations of the idea that the Commission's decisions
must fall within the limits of reasonableness or
rationality. As used in this context, the words
"arbitrary and capricious" mean no more than this.
658 P.2d at 610.
Hatch submits that the issues presented in the case at bar
fall within the limitations outlined above.

Spreader first

contends that the commission has misapplied the decision of Big
K Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah
1984).

This aspect of Spreader's argument falls within the

second level of review specified above:

The commission's find-

ing that the public convenience and necessity will not be
served by the granting of Spreader's application is a finding
of ultimate fact which can only be disturbed if it falls outside the limits of rationality so that it must be deemed arbitrary and capricious.

Wexpro II, 658 P.2d at 610.

See PBI

Freight Service v. Public Service Commission, 598 P.2d 1352,
1354-55 (Utah 1979).

The commission considered numerous rele-

vant factors in reaching its result, and not just the potential
financial harm to the protestants, and the commission's finding
therefore is not subject to challenge.

This portion of

Spreader's argument will be dealt with in Point II of this
brief.
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Spreader spends much of its brief arguing the credibility
of the evidence, yet the commission reviewed the evidence, saw
the witnesses and heard their testimony, and on that basis
resolved the issues of basic fact in this case against
Spreader.

Those issues include the nonexistence of any

deficiency in the existing services, the lack of anticipated
growth in the limited markets to be served, the determination
that existing services are adequate and responsive, the determination that existing fleets are underutilized and the finding
of probable financial harm to the protestants if the authority
were to be granted.

Those findings of the commission are, as

will be shown in Point III of this brief, supported by substantial evidence and are therefore not subject to challenge.
POINT II
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY ANALYZED ALL THE
RELEVANT FACTORS IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY WOULD BEST BE
SERVED BY DENIAL OF SPREADER'S APPLICATION.
The primary thrust of Spreader's argument on appeal is that
the commission failed to analyze the relevant factors in
reaching its conclusion that the public convenience and necessity would not be served by granting Spreader's application.
Specifically, Spreader asserts that the commission based its
decision primarily on a finding of financial harm to existing
carriers, and that the commission should have presumed certain
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public benefits to flow from the addition of another competitor
to the relevant market.

Contrary to Spreader's assertion, the

commission properly weighed and considered all the relevant
factors, including both the benefit and detriment to be derived
from further competition, in reaching its decision.
A.

The Commission Acts Within the Bounds of Its
Discretion When It Considers and Weighs the
Numerous Factors Bearing Upon Public Convenience and Necessity.

Under the standard of review set forth in the Wexpro II
case, the findings of the commission on questions of ultimate
fact are to be upheld if they fall within the limits of "reasonableness and rationality."

658 P.2d at 610. The finding of

public convenience and necessity is such a finding of ultimate
fact, because it is both a policy decision and a conclusion to
be drawn from the evidence.

PBI Freight Service v. Public

Service Commission, 598 P.2d 1352, 1354-55 (Utah 1979).

As the

court stated in an early transportation case:
Issuing a certificate of convenience and necessity is
an act of the executive department of state government, and when done pursuant to law is not subject to
judicial annulment. . . . What policy should be pursued, or what conclusions should be drawn from disputed facts is not a law question for the judiciary to
decide. Such questions must be determined by the person or body whose action depends upon the determination thereof.
Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d
298, 300 (1941).

In this case, the commission went through a

-14-

comprehensive analysis of all factors bearing upon the issue
before it, and its decision must therefore stand.
Spreader argues that the commission misapplied the standard
set forth in Big K Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d
1349 (Utah 1984).

The Big K case involved an application by a

trucking company (Big K) for authority to transport drilling
fluids between points within Utah.

The commission held that

Big K had failed to demonstrate that existing service was
deficient, on the apparent basis that no shipper was completely
deprived of service.

This court reversed, holding 1) that the

commission should have considered other factors, including the
benefit or detriment that would ensue from addition of another
competitor in the market, and 2) that the evidence established
a deficiency of service.

The finding of a deficiency of ser-

vice was based on evidence that Big K proposed to open terminals in parts of the state not otherwise locally served, thus
reducing travel time and cost of service.
In Big K, this court reaffirmed its earlier decisions holding that the determination of public convenience and necessity
depends upon an analysis of numerous factors.

This is not a

judicially created analysis, but rather is a statutory requirement.
brief).

Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-5 (1973) (quoted on page 2 of this
The Big K court held that one factor should not be

singled out and given extraordinary weight.
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Specifically, the

court held that the benefits and detriments of additional competition were important factors to be considered.
1354.

689 P.2d at

The court also noted that inadequacy of current service

and the potential for growth in demand for services should be
considered in appropriate cases,

Id.

at

1355.

Big K does not represent a departure from this court's
prior decisions in transportation cases.

Instead, it rep-

resents a reaffirmation of prior decisions holding that the
commission should not give excessive weight to any single
factor, to the exclusion of other important factors, when
determining the issue of public convenience and necessity.

In

Big K, the commission had given excessive weight to the deficiency of service standard, and had disregarded other factors
bearing upon the public convenience and necessity, including
the benefits to be derived from competition in that case.

The

court simply reaffirmed that the determination of public convenience and necessity depends upon an interworking of several
factors•
Review of other cases confirms this.

Although in other

cases the court has emphasized various single factors, that
individual emphasis has been the result of the court's belief
that the commission had ignored the particular factor under
discussion in each case.

In Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc.

v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958), for example, a

-16-

leading Utah transportation decision, the court reversed an
order of the commission granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity to an applicant carrier.

The commission

had based its finding of public convenience and necessity upon
a general showing that shippers would like more choices among
available carriers.

The court ruled that the applicant was

required to make a specific, affirmative showing of inadequacy
or lack of existing service before the application could be
granted.

The commission had unduly emphasized shipper demands,

and had improperly de-emphasized the adequacy of existing service.
The case of PBI Freight Service v. Public Service Commission, 598 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1979), provides an example of the
court's review of a correct decision of the public service
commission.

In that case, the commission granted the applicant

authority to carry gypsum products from Sevier County to all
points within Utah.

The court affirmed the commission because

the commission had considered all the relevant factors in
reaching its conclusion that the public convenience and necessity would be served.

Specifically, the commission had found

that the addition of a new carrier would result in an improvement in service; that it would result in a decrease in mileage
charges, including "dead-head" (empty) mileage charges; that it
was uncertain whether existing carriers could manage the burden
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of an anticipated increase in shipments; and that the additional traffic over congested roads was not excessive.

The

court found that the commission's analysis was adequate and was
supported by competent evidence, and therefore affirmed.
As will be shown below, the commission in the case at bar
carefully analyzed all of the relevant factors, and its findings were supported by competent evidence.

Accordingly, the

order of the commission should be affirmed.
B.

The Commission in This Case Carefully and
Correctly Analyzed All of the Factors Specified in the Big K Case and Its Predecessors.

In the case at bar, the commission carefully analyzed all
of the factors mandated by the Big K case and its predecessors.

The commission first looked at the potential benefits

the addition of another competitor might have upon the subject
market.

The commission noted that Spreader did not propose to

charge a rate lower than that currently being charged in the
market, and further noted that current rates were so low that
at least one shipper was cutting back on its own proprietary
fleet operations, and making greater use of certificated carriers, because of the competitive rates charged by the four
certificated carriers.

(R. 1496.)

Thus, the commission found

no price benefit to be derived from additional competition.
The commission also analyzed the competition factor with
regard to the efficient use of equipment, finding that each of
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the existing carriers possessed and operated adequate spreader
equipment, and that each had experienced excess spreading and
transportation equipment capacity.

(R. 1498.)

The commission

then determined that the projected level of growth in demand
did not justify the granting of the application.

(R. 1499.)

These determinations were consistent with the commission's
statutory duty, which provides that the commission shall regulate all common carriers "so as to prevent unnecessary duplication of service."

Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-4 (Supp. 1985).

As required by Big K, the commission also examined the adequacy of existing facilities, within the confines of the rule
that the applicant bears the burden of proving by specific evidence that existing facilities are inadequate.

Lake Shore

Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d
1061, 1063 (1958).

In Big K, the court made clear that,

although the adequacy of existing facilities was in part an
aspect of the competition factor, it was also an independent
factor in the analysis, and that the applicant bore the burden
of proving that existing facilities are inadequate.

689 P.2d

at 1355.
In the case at bar, the commission determined that the
level of existing service was "adequate and responsive to the
reasonable demands put on it."

(R. 1500.)

The only complaint

about existing spreader service that the commission found to be
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supported by substantial evidence was the inability to obtain
spreading trucks on short notice during the busy season,
(R. 1494.)

The commission found, however, that seven of the

nine witnesses making that complaint had not attempted to use
all of the carriers presently available to them.

(R. 1494.)

It further found that all of the existing carriers had excess
equipment capacity.

(R. 1498.)

With regard to transportation of light distillates (e.g.,
gasoline, jet fuel, etc.), the commission found that existing
service was also adequate.

One witness had complained of con-

sistently late deliveries, but the commission found that the
witness had been taking advantage of a special low rate which
provided for delivery at the carrier's convenience.

(R. 1494.)

The other witness complained of delivery and loading problems,
but the commission found that the failure rate immediately
prior to the hearing was less than two percent.

(R. 1494.)

Several witnesses testified with regard to crude oil
transportation.

One had experienced no problems, and was only

concerned with having as wide a choice among carriers as possible.

(R. 1494.) Another witness complained of a lack of

willingness by carriers to install certain hand rails on their
trucks, but the commission found that installation of the rails
would make it impossible for the carriers to load or unload
their trucks at other customers1 facilities.
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(R. 1494-95.)

The only other witness with regard to crude oil complained of
an inability to get trucks on short notice, especially on weekends.

(R. 1495-96.)

The commission found that the existing

carriers had tried to be cooperative with this witness, but
that the only way to satisfy the witness' demand would be for
the carriers to have idle equipment and drivers on hand waiting
for a call that might or might not come.

(R. 1496.)

The com-

mission determined that option to require an unacceptable level
of idle equipment.

(Id.)

Having found that the benefits to be derived from additional competition were minimal or non-existent, the commission
turned to analysis of the potential detriments which would
result from addition of another carrier.

Under Big K, that

analysis was to be done in terms of financial harm to existing
carriers.

Although financial harm alone is insufficient basis

for denial of an application, the Big K case held that financial harm could form the basis for denial of the application if
it undermined the ability of existing carriers to provide reliable service, comply with safety regulations or conform with
other applicable regulations.

689 P.2d at 1354.

Spreader argues that the commission relied almost exclusively on the financial ground in denying the application.

The

commission, however, recognized that Big K requires a balancing
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of the financial factor against the other applicable factors.
The commission stated in its order in this case:
[T]he Court [in Big K] established a balancing test
for the grant of authority, in which the public benefits to be anticipated from increased competition are
important factors for us to consider, but are not per
se dispositive. Against the prospective benefits must
be weighed the prospective detriment. One facet of
that detriment would be the impairment of the ability
of efficiently-run carriers to maintain their service
at existing levels of performance and safety.
(R. 1692.)
In the instant case, the commission found that the financial
harm posed the risks this court outlined in Big K.

The commis-

sion found that all of the existing carriers, except Matlack,
were financially weak.

(R. 1496-98, 1501.) Although Spreader

argues that the financial harm to the existing carriers was
minor, the commission found, in the case of Hatch, that $1.12
million of business annually was potentially divertible if the
application were granted.

(R. 1498.)

Similar findings were

made with respect to the other carriers.

(R. 1497-98.)

The

commission found that the financial harm posed the dangers
outlined in Big K:
While we are loathe to conclude Applicant's entry into
the market would so financially impair the existing
carriers that they would find themselves under pressure to cut corners on safety requirements, we cannot
blind ourselves to economic realities and the real
possibility of such occurring.
We must also consider that particularly the markets relevant here involve transportation to remote
parts of the state. It would be unfortunate indeed if
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Applicant's entry into the market precipitated the
closure of any of the existing carriers' terminals or
the curtailment of their operations into those areas.
Indeed this risk of deterioration of service into
remote parts of the state strongly distinguishes this
case from that presented in Big K in which the applicant proposed to open a terminal in an area not then
served by such a facility.
As our Findings above recognize, we cannot quantify the likely diversion of revenue from any one carrier. However, since all four have experienced losses
in their Utah intrastate operations, there is a substantial danger we are dealing with the straw capable
of breaking the camel's back. With little or no offsetting benefit in prospect, we choose not to run that
risk. (R. 1501-02.)
Spreader also argues that the commission failed to consider
whether existing carriers are efficiently operated.

Spreader,

however, in contending that existing carriers are not efficiently operated, bore the burden of proof as part of its showing that its application would serve the public convenience and
necessity.

See Big K, 689 P.2d at 1354-55; Lake Shore Motor

Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061,
1063; Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117
P.2d 293, 305 (1941).

All parties presented evidence on this

point, and Spreader cross examined the protesting carriers at
great length on their operations and financial results.

The

commission implicitly resolved the issue against Spreader.
(R. 1500-1501, 1692.) Among the supporting evidence was the
testimony of a customer who had reduced use of its own proprietary fleet because the services of the certificated carriers were "quite competitive."

(R. 439-42.)
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The commission's analysis of the factors going into its
conclusion that the public convenience and necessity would not
be served by granting of the application is precisely the
analysis this court mandated in Big K.

The analysis is not

unreasonable or irrational, and thus, under the standard of
review set forth in Wexpro II, should not be disturbed.

The

commission has made a policy decision supported by a wellreasoned and substantial analysis; it would be an improper
intrusion into the statutory process for this court to compel
the commission to reach a different policy decision.
C.

The Mere Fact that Granting of the Certificate Will Increase Competition Does Not
Require that the Commission Approve the
Application.

Spreader argues that the commission should have presumed
certain benefits to flow from the addition of a new competitor
into the market it proposed to serve, and that such benefits
require a finding that the public convenience and necessity
will be served by granting the application.

The prior deci-

sions of this court, including the Big K case, make clear that
competition should be considered, but that it may be either a
positive or negative factor in the analysis.

In the case at

bar, the commission properly concluded that competition was a
negative, rather than positive, factor.
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In Big K, the court placed a great deal of emphasis on the
competition factor in finding that the commission had not completed the proper analysis when it denied Big K's application.
The court recognized, however, that the policy of the Motor
Carrier Act was to do away with unrestrained competition, and
replace it with an analysis of competition and other factors as
they bear upon the ultimate question of public convenience and
necessity,

689 P.2d at 1355. The emphasis on competition in

Big K is merely a reflection of the court's finding that the
commission in the Big K PSC proceeding had failed to take that
factor into account in its analysis.

The court made clear that

competition can be either an affirmative or negative factor in
the analysis.
considered.

The requirement was only that competition be

The court stated:

In determining whether the public interest and
necessity are served by additional service, the Commission must consider numerous factors. It must weigh
the benefits to be derived from increased competition,
such as the potential beneficial effect upon rates,
customer service, the acquisition of equipment more
suitable to customer needs, the efficient use of
equipment, greater responsiveness in meeting future
shipper needs, and greater efficiency in the use of
route structures and interlining arrangements.

Of course, the Commission may not wholly disregard the effect that additional competition may have
on existing carriers. The Commission must not undercut the ability of efficiently operated carriers to
achieve sufficient financial stability so that they
can provide reliable service, comply with public
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safety regulations, and conform with other business
regulatory policies that further economic development
and the growth of new industries.
689 P.2d at 1354 (citations omitted).
Although the court stated that competition was usually an
affirmative factor in the equation, it stopped short of creating any presumption based on competition:
Except where market conditions require otherwise, such
as where markets are too small to support an additional carrier, or a new carrier seeks to "cream" a
market to the detriment of other carriers or small
shippers, competition is almost always an affirmative
factor in furthering the public convenience and necessity.
Id. at 1355.
This reasoning is consistent with the court's previous discussions of the competition factor.

In Lake Shore Motor Coach

Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958),
the applicant had relied on a general assertion of the benefits
to be derived from competition.

The court found that the

applicant's showing was inadequate, and that in order to prevail, the applicant was required to demonstrate the benefits to
be derived from competition by specific, affirmative evidence.
333 P.2d at 1064. The court stated:
Proving that public convenience and necessity would be
served by granting additional carrier authority means
something more than showing the mere generality that
some members of the public would like and on occasion
use such type of transportation service. . . . Our
understanding of the statute is that there should be a
showing that existing services are in some measure
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inadequate, or that public need as to the potential of
business is such that there is some reasonable basis
in the evidence to believe that public convenience and
necessity justify the additional proposed service.
For the rule to be otherwise would ignore the provisions of the statute; and also would make meaningless the holding of formal hearings to make such
determinations and render futile efforts of existing
carriers to defend their operating rights.
Id. at 1063 (footnote omitted).
The court in Big K relied extensively on Lake Shore in its
analysis.

Reading Big K and Lake Shore together makes clear

that Spreader's reliance in this case on the benefits to be
derived from competition is misplaced.

The commission con-

sidered those benefits, but found that competition in this case
would have undesirable negative consequences, both to the other
carriers and to the public at large.

Because the commission

appropriately weighed the competition factor, its conclusion
that competition is not in the public interest is not "irrational" or "unreasonable", Wexpro II, and should not be disturbed.
POINT III
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
Spreader devotes much of its brief to argument over the
credibility of the evidence supporting the commission's findings of basic fact.

Under the standard reaffirmed in Wexpro
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II, such pure fact-findings of the commission must stand if
they are supported by evidence of any substance whatsoever.
658 P.2d at 609.

In the instant case, the commission's find-

ings are supported by substantial evidence and should be
affirmed.
One issue that runs throughout the discussion of the specific evidentiary facts in this case is the question of the
consideration, if any, to be given the present services provided by Spreader under its lease with Matlack.

Where equip-

ment is leased to an authorized carrier, as is the arrangement
between Spreader and Matlack, the services provided by the
authorized carrier using that equipment constitute part of the
existing transportation facilities.

Utah Admin. Regs.

§ A67-05-90. This is because the certificated carrier is by
law providing the services, and presumably would use another
means to provide the services if the lease were to end.

In the

instant case, the commission applied this rule, reasoning that
a contrary rule would jeopardize the practice of leasing and
would create a regulatory loophole.

(R. 1502.)

Much of the evidence supporting the commission's findings
in this case has been described above.

Accordingly, Hatch will

deal here only with those specific factual contentions raised
in Spreader's brief.

-28-

A.

Adequacy of Existing Asphalt Transportation
Facilities.

Spreader first asserts that the existing asphalt transportation facilities are inadequate to meet periods of peak
demand.

Spreader supports this contention with a capsulization

of the testimony of several witnesses.

The record demon-

strates, however, that on cross examination each of those
witnesses made concessions which undercut Spreader's conclusion, and which showed only a general desire for additional
carriers, rather than a genuine inadequacy in existing services.

Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah

2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061, 1063 (1958).

Because of those conces-

sions, the commission concluded that the witnesses had either
not taken advantage of the available services or had not
experienced failures significant enough to justify granting of
the application.
Spreader asserts that District 5 of the Utah Department of
Transportation has experienced equipment availability problems.

The witness, however, admitted that the District's

transportation needs were decreasing, from 16 loads in 1983 to
12 loads in 1984.

(R. 128-29.)

The witness also conceded that

the District has not used the services of Hatch or Clark
(R. 133-36), and that there had been no equipment shortages for
two years.

(R. 148-49.)
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The representative of Koch Asphalt, who Spreader claims
testified to an inadequate equipment supply, also testified
that he saw no advantage, in terms of service, to granting
authority to Spreader.

(R. 160-64, 173.)

He also testified

that he had experienced only minor problems with the carriers
he had used, including such problems with Spreader.

(Id.)

The representative of Staker Paving and Construction gave
similar testimony.
plaints.

He testified that he had no real com-

In fact, he testified that, on one occasion, he had a

job, which had been scheduled for two days, run into an
unexpected third day.

Clark was unable to provide equipment

into the third day, because it was then committed elsewhere.
On extremely short notice, Hatch was able to satisfy the
witness* needs.

(R. 204, 930.)

Spreader next cites the testimony of representatives of
Jack B. Parson Companies and Fife Rock Products.

Those wit-

nesses both admitted that existing service was satisfactory and
that they had not used all available carriers.
360-61, 364.)

(R. 338,

Indeed, the representative of Fife testified

that his company had no need for certificated carrier service
of the type covered by the application at all during 1984.
(R. 355.)
Spreader asserts that its next supporting carrier, Asphalt
Systems, uses the services of Clark, and that Clark is late 80%
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of the time.

The witness disclosed on cross examination, how-

ever, that his company, by prearrangement with Clark, uses
Clark on a "carrier's convenience" basis, and in exchange for
this concession, Clark charges the company a discounted rate.
(R. 388.)

This witness also testified that the company has not

used other available carriers.

(R. 389, 396.)

The representatives of Logan City and Box Elder County,
also cited by Spreader, testified that they had not used the
services of all the available carriers.

(R. 536, 608-09.)

Further, the representative of Box Elder County testified that
existing services were satisfactory.

(R. 609, 611, 613.)

The final witness Spreader cites in support of its claim
that asphalt transportation services are inadequate testified
that he had no personal knowledge of the adequacy of service
(R. 566) and that demand for asphalt was down 20% statewide in
1984.

(R. 573-74.)

All of this evidence led the commission to a logical conclusion.

Although the witnesses testified that they would like

to see more equipment available, such extra capacity, which
would only be needed in instances of extraordinary demand,
would only exacerbate an already serious problem with idle
equipment.

The testimony of the asphalt shippers falls within

the confines of the court's decision in Lake Shore Motor Coach
Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958),
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that a showing by the applicant of a general desire for more
equipment availability is insufficient to meet the applicant's
burden of showing that additional equipment would enhance
existing services.
B.

333 P.2d at 1063.

Adequacy of Existing Crude Petroleum Transportation Facilities.

Spreader's next assertion is that the existing crude oil
transportation facilities are inadequate.

The commission found

that existing facilities were adequate, and its decision is
based on substantial evidence.
Spreader cites in detail the testimony of Larry Mouton, of
Amoco, whom Spreader maintains is dissatisfied with existing
services.

The evidence, however, demonstrated that Mouton

required trucks on 12 to 20 hours notice, usually on weekends
when his own proprietary fleet was unable to procure drivers.
(R. 672-73, 677-78.)

He demands that the carriers have excess

fleet and standby personnel on hand at all times, waiting for a
call that may or may not come, at whatever the cost may be to
the carriers.

(R. 677-79.)

In order to resolve this problem,

the carriers have offered to dedicate equipment to Amoco, but
Amoco refuses that arrangement.

(R. 679, 1049.) While

Spreader attempts to label Amoco as merely a "tough customer,"
the evidence supports the commission's conclusion that the
demands of Amoco were in fact unreasonable.
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(R. 1496.)

Two

other shippers described Amoco•s demands as unreasonable.
(R. 521-22, 839-40.)
The testimony of Chevron representatives was also not as
critical of existing services as Spreader asserts.

Although

one Chevron representative (Taylor) testified that he felt the
services of common carriers in Utah were "a little below average" (R. 492), he admitted several times on cross examination
that service was satisfactory.

(R. 496, 497, 501-02.)

Another

Chevron witness also testified that existing service was satisfactory and responsive.

(R. 521-23.)

Most of Chevron's problems related to hauling of crude oil
from wells in the Uintah Basin during the winter when the pipeline unexpectedly shuts down.

(R. 506.)

Those hauls, however,

are on an emergency basis, often with only two hours notice.
(R. 506, 520-23.)

The witness testified that he did not expect

the carriers to maintain excess equipment capacity to handle
these unpredictable emergencies.

(R. 520-21.)

With respect to

the Uintah Basin situation, the witness characterized the
existing carriers as cooperative and responsive.

(R. 521-23.)

Other than the Uintah Basin situation, this witness characterized the services of the existing carriers as "excellent."
(R. 520.)
Based on this evidence, the commission correctly found that
the existing facilities for transportation of crude oil are
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adequate and responsive.

(R. 1494-96.)

The finding is sup-

ported by substantial evidence, is not unreasonable or irrational, and should be affirmed.
C.

Adequacy of Existing Transportation Facilities for Refined Petroleum Products.

Spreader also argues that the facilities for transportation
of refined products ("distillates") must be found inadequate as
a matter of law.
flicting.

The evidence here, as elsewhere, was con-

The commission resolved the evidentiary issues

against Spreader, and that resolution was based on substantial
evidence.
Spreader contends that Chevron found existing services to
be inadequate.

With regard to late deliveries, the Chevron

representative admitted that the carriers were often called on
three or fewer hours notice.

(R. 1185, 1193.)

Certainly, car-

riers should not be required to keep idle equipment available
to respond to such demands at all times without delay.
Spreader also asserts that Chevron complained of numerous
service failures with existing carriers.

The evidence was,

however, that during the period in question, carriers had
handled 2700 loads for Chevron.

Of those loads, Energy Express

experienced four failures, Matlack experienced two and Clark
experienced none.

(R. 496, 1189, 1191-92; Ex. 18-20.)

The

commission found the failure rate to be less than 2% and that
such rate was acceptable.

(R. 1494.)
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The other shipper Spreader cites as having complaints
regarding distillate transportation is Amoco.

The Amoco rep-

resentative testified, however, that Amoco1s concern was with
crude oil transportation, not distillate transportation.
(R. 667-68.)

This witness admitted that distillate trans-

portation services were satisfactory.

(R. 630, 667-68.)

The evidence regarding distillate transportation is that
existing services are adequate and satisfactory.

The commis-

sion's resolution of this issue was appropriate and should be
affirmed.
D.

Projected Growth in the Utah Asphalt Industry.

Spreader next contends that the commission should have
found that projected growth in the Utah asphalt industry justified granting of the application.

The commission found:

Applicant presented some evidence intended to
indicate a prospective growth in the markets involved.
In the case of asphalt hauls, the evidence indicates a
market decline, since the major sources of asphalt now
appear to exist out of state in contrast with the
situation a few years ago. Giving the Applicant the
maximum benefit of its evidence on growth, the growth
indicated appears insufficient to justify by itself
the granting of the application. (R. 1499.)
The evidence supports the commission's conclusion.

At the

outset, it is appropriate to note that the growth projections
cited in Spreader's brief are for usage of asphalt from all
sources, and are not restricted to intrastate sources.
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Spreader's application, however, only involves transportation
from sources within the state.
longer produce asphalt.

Most of the Utah refineries no

(R. 437, 683.)

The only current

manufacturer of asphalt in Utah is Phillips.

(R. 64-66).

All

other asphalt is shipped into the state from out-of-state
sources; these interstate shipments are not within the scope of
the commission's regulatory powers, and Spreader already has
the requisite interstate operating authority.

(Ex. 3).

A review of the shipper testimony indicates some growth
projected by some of the shippers (R. 166, 317), little or no
change in growth by some of the others (R. 166), and a decline
in growth by others.

(R. 355, 378, 573-74.) When the relative

size of the various shippers is considered (for example, a 15
to 20% decline for the Department of Transportation (R. 129,
573-74), viewed as a whole as against a 25% growth factor
projected by Parsons Asphalt (R. 317)), the comparison results
in no net growth.

Spreader's own witness indicated that, in

his view, the average rate of growth in shipping was 5%.
(R. 1254.)
The commission also had before it evidence that the existing shippers had excess equipment capacity.

(Ex. 63-65.)

Given the evidence before the commission, its determination
that growth was minimal and did not justify granting the application was supported by the evidence and should be affirmed.
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E.

Projected Growth in Crude Oil Transportation
Needs.

Spreader next contends that projected growth in the transportation of crude oil justified the granting of its application.

Spreader only cites two witnesses for this contention.

One indicated that he anticipated an 8% growth rate over the
next two years.

The other was in the depressed shale oil busi-

ness, and his anticipation of growth was highly speculative.
The commission also had before it evidence that the existing carriers had substantial excess capacity in this area.
Hatch, for example, consistently had idle equipment available
for the transportation of crude.

(Ex. 62.)

The decision

whether to allow a new carrier to take new business, or whether
to allow existing carriers to handle it, is within the exclusive policy-making authority of the commission.

This court has

stated:
Having found now that the convenience and necessity of
the public in the territory proposed to be served,
require additional service . . . the question is:
Should such new service be rendered by existing carriers or by the new applicant? This question poses
for the commission, not the finding of a factual
answer, but the determination of a matter of policy.
Which in the opinion of the commission will best subserve the public convenience, necessity and welfare?
Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d
298, 305 (1941).

In this case, the commission determined that
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existing carriers could and should handle any growth, particularly since the existing carriers had idle equipment
available.
F.

The court should not overrule that policy choice.

Projected Growth in Refined Product Transportation Needs.

Spreader's contention concerning projected growth in
refined product transportation is subject to the same rule
described above.

The evidence Spreader cites is general in its

terms and does not quantify the level of expected growth.

Only

one witness quantified the projection, indicating a modest
growth rate of 7%.

The commission acted within its sound

discretion in determining that existing carriers could and
should handle that increase if it materialized.
G.

Summary of Evidentiary Argument.

In summary, the evidentiary argument Spreader presents in
its brief amounts to a reargument of factual disputes already
argued to and resolved by the commission.

The existence of

evidence which, if unrebutted, could have supported the application does not require that the commission's decision be overturned.

Taken as a whole, the commission's decision is a

reasonable and rational resolution of the policy issues before
it, and should be affirmed.
Spreader's witnesses really had no substantial problems
with the adequacy of existing services.

-38-

Time after time, the

shipper witnesses conceded that their real concern was simply
having as many choices as possible available to them.

This

court set to rest the contention that such general desires
could support an application for authority nearly 30 years ag
in Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett/ 8 Utah 2d
293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958):
Proving that public convenience and necessity would be
served by granting additional carrier authority means
something more than showing the mere generality that
some members of the public would like and on occasion
use such type of transportation service. . . . Our
understanding of the statute is that there should be a
showing that existing services are in some measure
inadequate, or that public need as to the potential of
business is such that there is some reasonable basis
in the evidence to believe that public convenience and
necessity justify the additional proposed service.
333 P.2d at 1063 (footnote omitted).
CONCLUSION
The decision of the public service commission in this cas
is supported by substantial evidence and is well-reasoned.
represents a fair and just resolution of policy decisions
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I

within the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission.

Accord-

ingly, the decision of the commission should be affirmed.
DATED this Z/£-

day of April, 1986.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Rodney
Attorneys for Protestant W. S
Hatch Company
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